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ABSTRACT 
Idiographic digital profiling (IDP) is the application of behavioral analysis to the field of digital forensics. 
Previous work in this field takes a nomothetic approach to behavioral analysis by attempting to understand 
the aggregate behaviors of cybercriminals. This work is the first to take an idiographic approach by examining 
a particular subject's digital footprints for immediate use in an ongoing investigation. IDP provides a 
framework for investigators to analyze digital behavioral evidence for the purposes of case planning, subject 
identification, lead generation, obtaining and executing warrants, and prosecuting offenders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Behavioral analysis, once the exclusive domain of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s profilers, had 
turned into a mainstream area of scientific study. 
Originally focused on violent offenders, behavioral 
analysis utilizes concepts like motive, modus 
operandi, signature behaviors, offender typologies 
and victim profiles to better investigate criminal 
activity, understand offender motivations, link 
criminal acts, and target demographics for 
prevention efforts.  
Digital behavioral analysis is a relatively new field 
that applies the concepts of traditional behavioral 
analysis to the digital footprints of criminals. The 
crimes analyzed can be digital crimes, or those that 
are digitally facilitated through researching, 
planning, communicating, documenting, or 
otherwise enabling criminal activity. Some 
preliminary work was done in this field by applying 
a traditional criminological approach to cybercrime. 
Grabosky proposed a criminological approach to 
computer crime, providing a categorization of 
computer-specific offenses (Grabosky, 2000).  
The development of typologies and taxonomies of 
cybercriminals has also been proposed. Krone 
proposed a typology for a specific type of computer 
criminal–the child pornographer (Krone, 2004). 
Nykodym, et al. (2005) proposed a similar typology 
for insider cybercriminals. Rogers (2010) detailed a 
taxonomy relevant to hackers that included most 
traditional cybercrimes including virus writing, 
hacking, and professional criminals. (Rogers, A two-
dimensional circumplex approach to the 
development of a hacker taxonomy, 2006). Rogers 
(2010) further applied the concept of social learning 
theory and moral disengagement toward furthering 
the understanding of cybercriminal behavior. 
Victimology has been studied in several areas of 
digital crime. Online fraud and how victims are 
selected was studied as part of a Microsoft study on 
Nigerian 419 scammers (Herley, 2012). Similarly, 
Ngo and Paternoster (2011) looked at victim profiles 
in general across multiple types of cybercrime. 
Finally, profiles of user behavior on computers have 
been researched. In Digital Profiling: A Computer 
Forensics Approach and Digital Scene of Crime: 
Technique of Profiling Users, Colombini and 
Collella (2013) develop a set-theoretic approach to 
building a usage profile of an individual on a device 
for the purposes of linking profiles across devices 
(Colombini, Colella, & Italian Army, 2012).  
Most of the prior art takes a nomothetic approach to 
behavioral analysis by attempting to understand the 
aggregate behaviors of cybercriminals. This work is 
the first to take an idiographic approach to digital 
profiling by examining a particular subject’s Internet 
activities and electronic media for the purposes of 
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using digital footprints left behind for immediate use 
in an ongoing investigation.  
2. GOALS OF IDIOGRAPHIC DIGITAL 
PROFILES 
Building a profile of a subject in a criminal 
investigation can be used to provide probable cause 
for and facilitate the execution of search warrants, 
assist in subject interviews, link criminal activity, 
and provide additional case leads. An informative 
example can be found in the criminal complaint filed 
against Ross William Ulbricht, aka “The Dread 
Pirate Roberts”, the alleged mastermind behind Silk 
Road, the Darknet service that facilitated the sale of 
illegal drugs and banned items over TOR. Silk Road 
was estimated to have over one billion dollars (US) 
in annual revenue. Some of the key profile findings 
that assisted in tracking Ulbricht and obtaining a 
warrant for his arrest include the following: 
The first mention of Silk Road was on 
www.shroomery.org by the user “altoid”, appearing 
to be a veiled advertisement for the service and 
provide pointers on how to find it. “Altoid” only 
posted one message to the site, and directed users to 
the blog silkroad420.wordpress.com, which was 
started 4 days earlier by an anonymous TOR user. 
Two days later, a user with the name “altoid” posted 
another advertisement with similar wording for a 
“heroin store” on bitcointalk.org and pointed users 
to the same blog. 
Eight months later, the user “altoid” posted another 
message to the bitcointalk.org board looking for an 
“IT pro”. The post requested the user respond to 
rossulbricht@gmail.com. 
The Google account was registered to a Ross 
Ulbricht. The picture on his Google+ account was 
the same as a Ross Ulbricht that had registered a 
LinkedIn account. The LinkedIn account listed 
Ulbricht as being 29 years old, with a BS in physics 
from the University of Texas and attendance at a 
graduate program at the University of Pennsylvania 
in Materials Science and Engineering. Ulbricht 
stated in his profile that he was now involved in an 
"economic simulation" of living in a "world without 
the systemic use of force" by "institutions and 
governments. 
Ulbricht's Google+ profile contained a link to videos 
on mises.org. The site had a user profile for Ross 
Ulbricht with a picture that matched his Google+ and 
LinkedIn pictures. 
The Dread Pirate Roberts contain a link to mises.org 
in his signature on Silk Road postings. The Dread 
Pirate Roberts regularly posted using a Pacific 
Standard Time (PST) time code. 
IP address logs showed logins to the Silk Road 
website from an administrator at an Internet cade 
near Ulbricht's home in San Francisco.  
The logins to Ulbricht's Google account occurred 
from the home of a friend of Ulbricht’s. Ulbricht and 
his friend posted YouTube videos confirming they 
lived together. 
Ulbricht logged on to the site Stack Overflow with 
his Google account information and asked "How can 
I connect a Tor hidden service using curl in php?" 
One minute after posting, Ulbricht changed his Stack 
Overflow name from "Ross Ulbricht" to "frosty" and 
his registered email to "frosty@frosty.com". The 
SSH key on the Silk Road server was 
frosty@frosty.com. 
The special agents investigating Ulbricht eventually 
tracked a shipment of fake identity documents that 
he solicited as the Dread Pirates Roberts to his home, 
and used the above information to tie him to the 
illicit Silk Road marketplace. The FBI seized the 
Silk Road web servers on 2 October 2013 (United 
States Government, 2013). 
The Silk Road forensics work highlights some of the 
key elements of creating a digital profile for an 
originally unknown offender. Their investigators 
found key identifiers associated with the crime, 
linked the anonymous identifiers to sites that had 
real name identities, obtained information on the 
technical expertise and social interactions of the 
subject, and used IP address geolocation to tie 
activity in the virtual world to a physical address. 
This highlights several of the goals in developing an 
idiographic digital profile: 
 Cross-site Tracking. Tracing an individual’s 
actions across multiple sites through their 
use of common phrases, signatures, or 
usernames can open up previously unknown 
leads. Creating a list of relevant sites can 
also generate a list of locations where the 
subject’s passwords can be obtained more 
easily in the event strong encryption is 
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encountered locally, given likely password 
reuse (Gaw & Felten, 2006). 
 Identifying an Anonymous Subject. 
Anonymous users are likely to break 
discipline and inadvertently use real 
information (or a real location) at some 
point, creating an avenue for identification. 
Using the cross-site tracking information 
and legal processes (e.g., subpoenas), a 
user’s true identity can be uncovered. 
 Mapping a Criminal Enterprise. The skills 
and sophistication of a subject can identify 
their role in a criminal enterprise, ranging 
from head boss to technical advisor to hired 
gun. Skills can be criminally oriented, such 
as building IEDs or hacking, or legitimate 
skills that can support criminal activity, such 
as financial or coding expertise. 
 Enumerating Associates. Understanding the 
social network that a subject engages with is 
helpful in targeting underlings or peers for 
initial investigative action. By prosecuting 
other subjects lower down the food chain, 
investigators can work upward (or sideways, 
in the case of peers) to the prime subject. 
Having an assessment of the sociability of 
the subject can also assist in decision 
making regarding the likely efficacy of 
consensual monitoring or account takeover 
actions. 
 Obtaining and Executing a Warrant. The 
material gathered during the creation of the 
profile can help link the subject’s activities 
to assist in obtaining probable cause for a 
search and/or arrest warrant. Obtaining 
information on the countermeasures 
deployed by the subject (in the Silk Road 
case, deletion of information on a VPN 
server) can help in planning the execution to 
avoid unintentional or deliberate data 
destruction. 
 Providing Subject Interview Insights. 
Understanding the motivation and mindset 
of a subject can assist investigators in theme 
development for an interview. Additionally, 
being able to assess the technical skills of 
the subject provides a barometer to 
determine if an individual is being deceptive 
regarding those skills, and allows 
investigators to have the requisite skills 
available to assist the interviewers. 
The ultimate goal of the proposed framework is to 
organize digital intelligence regarding a subject into 
a timely, actionable profile.  
3. DIGITAL PROFILE FRAMEWORK 
The proposed digital profile framework is broken up 
into two sections, digital biographical information 
and a multi-axis competency/affinity profile. The 
digital biographical information consists of 
identifiers, websites, signatures, usernames, 
passwords, and other information that can provide a 
pattern of usage for a subject. It can also include real 
life biographical data if that information is known. 
The profile axes are both quantitative and 
qualitative–they evaluate the subject’s abilities in 
four areas: technical ability, countermeasures, 
sociability, and domain ability. Both sections of the 
profile should be considered dynamic and should be 
revised as more information is obtained about the 
subject. 
3.1 Digital Biography 
The digital biography serves as a tracking 
mechanism for all currently known (and suspected) 
information about the subject’s Internet activities. 
The search for information should be iterative–
identifying a unique, new username might trigger a 
Google search for permutations of that same 
username. Similarly, the identification of a signature 
in a web forum posting may trigger a search for that 
same signature, leading to additional usernames on 
a different forum. The information included can be 
considered probabilistic until confirmed through 
independent corroboration. 
Generally, a single email address or message posting 
is the starting point for gathering information. That 
identifier is then searched for and the relevant, 
resulting pages are subpoenaed to obtain subscriber 
information, with any additional identifiers taken 
from the returns. That information is then collected, 
and the process is repeated iteratively until all leads 
are exhausted (Compton & Hamilton, 2011). 
Information may be obtained directly via subpoena 
or through a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
(MLAT), but not all information is likely to be 
located with providers that are accessible through 
these mechanisms and some leads may not be able 
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to be fully explored. The information that should be 
included in the biographical section includes the 
following: 
 Identifiers. Any usernames/email 
addresses/handles used on any websites are 
useful in tracking the activities of a subject. 
The more obscure the username, the easier 
it is to search for and individuate. When 
subpoenaing information from providers, 
any subscriber information, IP addresses 
that accessed the site under that subscriber’s 
identity, passwords (if available), and 
answers to recovery questions should be 
obtained.  
 Passwords. Because subjects are likely to 
reuse passwords, any passwords available 
from sites that do not store hashes (or store 
non-salted hashes that can be attacked) 
should be obtained. Subjects may re-use 
those same passwords on harder-to-break 
drive encryption like TrueCrypt or PGP, or 
may use permutations of a previous 
password. Personal information, including 
other passwords, can be used to create a 
custom attack dictionary for tools like 
AccessData’s DNA or the Passware suite.  
 Sites Visited. Each of the sites visited by the 
subject can be cross-searched for all of the 
other identifiers found and the results can be 
monitored on a go-forward basis. The types 
of sites visited may provide insight into 
interests or hobbies, technical 
competencies, or social contacts that are 
helpful in building a profile. The 
investigator should request the web logs of 
any accesses from the same IP addresses at 
identified sites. These may include referrer 
information that links to other sites used by 
the subject, or browser string history that 
will provide details about the subject’s web 
access methods. 
 IP Addresses. IP addresses used by the 
subject can be obtained based on the web 
logs from all of the identified sites as noted 
above, and through subpoenas to the 
subject’s residential Internet Service 
Provider. The investigator should also 
search for all IP addresses in Google (some 
sites leave web logs or similar tracking 
mechanisms viewable). Depending on the 
circumstances, investigators can request a 
trap/trace on any IP addresses of interest, 
and may want to consider subpoenas to the 
major search providers for additional 
activity from those IP addresses. All IP 
addresses identified should have the date 
and time noted for later correlation through 
device forensics.  
 Locations. Any physical locations 
mentioned by the subject or associated with 
the subject (through IP geolocation, for 
example) should be collected. Posting times 
(and time zone information) should be 
collected as well for future use in tracking 
the subject’s movements and determining 
the subject’s current location. Codepages 
used and browser languages in request 
strings, if logged, can assist in country-of-
origin checks. 
 Associates. The identifiers of all of the 
subject’s associates, from contacts on social 
networking sites to individuals using the 
same IP addresses, should be collected and 
retained. The decision on whether or not to 
build a profile on known associates will be 
an investigation specific decision based on 
resource availability. 
The biographical information can be correlated with 
any non-digital information acquired from 
commercial and governmental sources. In the United 
States, this includes law enforcement databases like 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National 
Crime Information Center and commercial 
aggregators like Choicepoint, TLO, and Lexis-
Nexis. The non-digital information can be iteratively 
combined with the digital information until all 
reasonable leads have been followed. 
3.2 Affinity/Competency Axes 
As noted above, psychographic information about an 
offender obtained through digital forensics is used to 
create a multi-axis profile. The technical ability axis 
covers a subject’s technical skill, as well as their 
adoption of new technologies (technophilia). The 
countermeasures axis looks at the subject’s use of 
protective measures both before and after criminal 
activity. The sociability axis looks at a subject’s 
social interactions, both online and offline. The 
domain ability axis evaluates the subject’s 
criminally relevant skillset, generally with the help 
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of a domain expert. While each axis can be 
quantified, which may be helpful in multi-offender 
conspiracies when deciding which subject to target, 
they are more useful as qualitative measures in 
investigative planning, developing interview 
themes, and performing investigative actions. 
3.2.1 Technical Ability 
Technical ability, for the purposes of profiling, 
consists of a subject’s expertise with digital 
technologies, as opposed to other technical skills 
(e.g., engine repair). There are two distinct subareas 
that are of interest in the investigative profile–
general expertise and the adoption of new 
technologies. 
General computer literacy can be difficult to assess, 
even through direct testing. Self-assessment has 
been shown to be inaccurate (Merritt, Smith, & 
Renzo, 2005), and the assessor needs to have an 
equal or greater level of literacy than the subject to 
adequately evaluate their skills. As such, it is 
invaluable to utilize digital forensics specialists in 
making this assessment. While investigators may 
encounter subjects who have a deep expertise in a 
narrow area of computing (e.g., printer repair), this 
is atypical and can be accounted for by noting the 
discrepancy in skills as part of the profile. Subjects 
can be grouped into five categories based on their 
general computer abilities.  
3.2.1.1 Functionally Illiterate. These subjects are 
not likely to make use of digital technologies. They 
will have little to no online footprint beyond a single 
email account, and if they do utilize a computer it is 
to perform a specific task, such as checking email, 
that they have learned through rote memorization. If 
they have a cell phone at all, it is likely to be a feature 
phone and used solely for voice calls. They are not 
likely to own or use digital cameras, tablets, or other 
high tech gear.  
The functionally illiterate subject will resist adopting 
new technologies unless provided a use case that 
makes it impractical to avoid. There will likely be 
minimal digital evidence to examine with these 
subjects, though the use of older technologies may 
be more common due to their comfort level and 
memorization-based understanding. In general, 
individuals that are functionally illiterate don’t 
require a digital profile. 
3.2.1.2 Casual User. The casual user is the most 
common subject encountered. These subjects grew 
up using digital technology or acquired skills and 
built proficiency through extensive work or personal 
use. They will use technologies that they are 
comfortable with, and will adopt new technologies 
as they become more commonplace. 
The casual user may have gaps in their knowledge, 
but will know how to conduct Internet searches, 
install software, send emails and instant messages, 
and take pictures with their smartphone and send 
them via MMS. The casual user does not understand 
nor seeks to understand the science behind most of 
what they do, does not read technical blogs, and is 
not interested in technology for technology’s sake. 
The amount of digital material that the casual user 
possesses is going to be a factor of their 
discretionary income and their need to keep up with 
the Joneses. They will regularly upgrade their cell 
phones every two years, will own a tablet and a 
laptop, and may have a digital camera lying around. 
The casual user is not likely to have multiple hard 
drives or extensive amounts of external storage 
beyond what they use for backup. 
The casual user may have an expansive online 
footprint. Extensive use of social media and the 
presence of a small number of email accounts are not 
uncommon, and are bounded by the sociability axis 
rather than technological understanding. They are 
likely to use a single search engine, and may 
regularly visit web locations based on their non-
computing interests. The casual user has no 
problems ordering goods from Amazon, watching 
Netflix on their Xbox, or doing banking online. 
3.2.1.3 Power User. The power user is differentiated 
by a love of technology, but does not have a formal 
background in computer science or computer 
engineering. The power user is very likely to utilize 
preventative measures (see countermeasures below) 
without a deep understanding of how to deploy 
them. They may utilize software like TOR out of 
curiosity, and then abandon it shortly thereafter. 
They will have multiple email accounts and an 
extensive online presence. The power user is more 
likely than the casual user to adopt multiple online 
personas, and may use different personas for 
different actions.  
Power users understand how technology works 
together, but are missing many of the foundational 
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concepts of computing. They know what an IP 
address is, but do not understand how routing works. 
They will be able to talk about the features of the 
latest chipset, but would not be able to build a logic 
gate. The power user is also likely to overestimate 
their knowledge base in relation to others.  
Power users are very interested in new technologies, 
and will acquire the latest and greatest toys to play 
with. The power user will install numerous software 
packages on their systems. Executing a warrant on 
the residence of a power user is likely to require 
extensive time, as they will have multiple devices 
from most current technological categories.  
3.2.1.4 IT Professional. Unlike the power user, the 
IT professional uses technology as a means to an 
end. They are likely to have a degree or other formal 
training in information technology, and are likely to 
hold certificates in networking or system 
administration. They may have programming skills, 
and possess an accurate understanding of the terms 
and concepts related to technology that they use in 
conversation. 
The IT professional, unlike the power user, is more 
likely to bring home their knowledge and expertise 
to professionalize their personal technology usage. 
They are likely to have a backup strategy, to 
maintain up-to-date antivirus on their systems, and 
to employ encryption appropriately.  
The IT professional may or may not have an 
extensive online footprint, depending on their 
sociability. Their usage of technology sites is more 
likely to be learning and problem-solving oriented, 
as opposed to gadget-oriented. Some IT 
professionals may be technophiles–like the power 
user they might spend discretionary income on tech 
toys–but they are more likely to understand concepts 
like upgrade cycles and not necessarily buy or 
deploy the first version of a new technology.  
3.2.1.5 Computer Scientist. The computer scientist 
has a deep background in computing, with degrees 
in computer science or computer engineering 
(although rare, autodidacts at this level do exist). 
They possess a deep understanding of computer 
operations, and can develop their own software and 
hardware if needed.  
While the power user employs technology for its 
own sake, the computer scientist will be more likely 
to stay with a technology for which they have a deep 
understanding. They may continue to use a platform 
for an extended period, staying with Android phones 
instead of moving to iOS just because a sleek new 
device is available. Because they have a strong 
knowledge investment, they may hold on to older 
systems longer, but once they do switch they quickly 
attain a mastery level of the new technology. While 
power users and IT professionals may have 
programming skills, the computer scientist has 
software engineering skills. While a programmer 
can develop new software, a computer scientist 
develops new algorithms.   
Executing a search warrant on the home of a 
computer scientist should be done with caution. 
They are not as likely to have made mistakes in 
setting up their systems, and may have employed 
less common (or even homebrewed) protections on 
their systems.  
Determining what level of skill a particular subject 
is at can be challenging, but there are areas that can 
assist in the determination, including: 
 Education. Does the individual possess 
degrees or certifications in digital 
technology, or have they attended basic or 
advanced skills training?  
 Terminology. In the subject’s 
communications, do they discuss 
technology and do they use technical terms 
accurately?  
 Sites Visited. Are the sites they visit 
oriented toward gadgets, toward 
implementation guidance, or toward 
research? Does the subject post on 
discussion boards related to technology, and 
are they asking for guidance or providing it? 
 Device Ownership. How frequently does 
the subject purchase new cell phones, 
tablets, or laptops? What does the subject do 
with their old equipment? 
 Physical Activities. Does the subject attend 
conferences related to information 
technology or subscribe to professional 
journals? 
The subject’s technical ability and financial standing 
both impact their technophilia, or desire to possess 
and use new equipment. A subject may spend a large 
amount of their discretionary income on acquiring 
the latest technology for social standing reasons as 
well as technical reasons. Because of this, the 
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possession of the latest device is not necessarily an 
indicator of technical ability, but it does show a 
willingness to adopt new technology. 
Subjects who have low technical ability but adopt 
technology extensively are frequently the best 
individuals to digitally exploit. They are more likely 
to incorporate technology into all aspects of their 
life, including the criminal ones, and their low ability 
may mean they have not taken adequate protective 
steps (or implemented them properly if they have).  
3.2.2 Countermeasures 
Related to but separate from the technical axis is the 
subject’s use of countermeasures. While there is 
some overlap between the subject’s technical ability 
and their use of basic protections, it is not absolute. 
The computer scientist may not bother to encrypt 
their hard drive for performance reasons, while the 
casual user may have a password and encryption 
employed on their new iPhone because it was 
recommended by a friend.  
Countermeasures can be grouped into two 
categories–those that are deployed to prevent 
detection, and those that are deployed to hamper an 
investigation. Some technologies, such as 
encryption, can serve both purposes–a child 
pornographer might encrypt files that they send to 
other child pornographers to prevent their email 
provider from detecting the contraband traversing 
their network. Similarly, they may encrypt their files 
at rest to prevent them from being used as evidence 
against them if they are caught.  
Although the use of digital countermeasures by 
criminals has been well documented for decades, 
(Denning & Baugh Jr., 1999) they have not been 
evaluated on a continuum to-date. There are multiple 
levels of digital countermeasure that can be 
deployed by criminals detailed below, and each 
represents a higher degree of protection (and 
possibly paranoia).  
3.2.2.1 Passwords. Passwords have become so 
ubiquitous that their absence is more of an anomaly 
than their presence. Despite user education, 
however, most users will choose poor passwords in 
the absence of complexity controls. Additionally, 
users will re-use passwords (or variants of 
passwords) on multiple sites. Choosing stronger 
passwords and not re-using passwords show 
disciplined behavior and more complex 
countermeasures are likely to be encountered. While 
password reuse is a boon for investigators when 
strong encryption is encountered, reuse tends to be 
inversely proportional to the complexity of the 
password employed (Florencio & Herley, 2007). 
3.2.2.2 Device Sharing. Subjects that share physical 
space with others, including spouses and roommates, 
may have common devices. These can include 
anything from wireless access points to laptops, and 
may have separate user accounts for each individual. 
Because sharing generally requires setting up an 
additional account, the act of not sharing is a low-
level countermeasure. Subjects that 
compartmentalize their criminal activities may share 
some devices but refuse to allow access to others, 
potentially making the restricted use devices higher 
value targets when performing a forensic triage. 
3.2.2.3 Network Usage. The conditions under which 
a subject connects to the Internet can show both their 
technical knowledge and risk aversion. At home, a 
reasonable countermeasure would be the use of 
WPA2, which comes pre-configured on most 
modern routers. Using a wired-only connection may 
be a countermeasure (or may indicate the subject is 
a high-end gamer or using older equipment). An 
aware subject isn’t likely to login to their personal 
email from a hotel kiosk, but they may use open 
wireless access points in places with few cameras to 
connect to the Internet semi-anonymously. 
3.2.2.4 Basic Software Protections. Most 
computers come with at least a trial version of anti-
virus and anti-malware software pre-installed. 
Because automatic updates to the operating system 
are turned on by default in modern operating 
systems, patch currency is less of an indicator than it 
used to be. More technical users may custom 
configure software firewalls, turn off unnecessary 
services, or run additional anti-malware software. At 
the extreme, a subject may run a profiling 
application to identify new applications or services 
on their system.  
3.2.2.5 Encryption. The use of encryption generally 
requires the subject to take active steps to install and 
manage additional software. Subjects can use 
encryption at-rest, and software including PGP and 
TrueCrypt can provide encrypted files, encrypted 
containers, or encrypted drives that cannot be 
unencrypted by brute force if the subject chooses a 
strong password. Encrypted containers and 
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encrypted files are of particular interest in that they 
indicate selective encryption and can provide 
pointers to areas of interest. At the high end, a 
subject may employ encryption for network 
communications as well in the form of a VPN. A 
subject that is using open wireless access points and 
a VPN connection to a third party server is utilizing 
very high levels of countermeasures. 
3.2.2.6 Anonymizers. At the easy end of anonymity, 
a subject may use In Private modes in their web 
browsing software. While this prevents the 
recording locally of activity, it does not provide 
anonymity to the server. For this, subjects need to 
use web-based anonymizers to hide their browsing. 
Similar services are available for email via 
anonymous remailers. Even more sophisticated is 
the use of onion routing software like TOR to route 
traffic through multiple hops before reaching its 
destination. This provides layers of anonymity that 
are difficult to trace back, but comes at a speed cost. 
Subjects using TOR have made a conscious decision 
to trade usability for protection. 
3.2.2.7 Steganography. While steganography is 
much-hyped, in practical terms it has limited uses as 
a countermeasure. When communicating covertly, 
steganography can be used to hide content in plain 
sight, but encryption is a more general purpose tool 
to transmit secret messages. As such, steganography 
identified on a subject’s machine is indicative of fear 
of the presence of a message being found out as 
opposed to the message itself. 
3.2.2.8 Counterforensics. At the highest end of the 
countermeasure spectrum are counterforensics 
techniques. These include false flag operations 
(intentionally fabricating forensics information to 
frame another individual or entity), cleanup routines 
that alter logfiles to remove traces of a subject’s 
activities, and destructive wiping which makes 
logical data irrecoverable for later analysis. The use 
of counterforensics techniques indicates that there is 
strong technical knowledge present in either the 
subject or someone advising the subject, and that the 
subject places a high value on their criminal 
activities not being uncovered.  
Identifying the countermeasures in use can allow 
investigators to avoid digital tripwires in serving 
warrants or seizing devices. Additionally, any digital 
surveillance can be curtailed for subjects who 
employ more extreme countermeasures as they are 
more likely to be vigilant about aberrant connections 
and processes. Finally, the use of extreme 
countermeasures by individuals with low technical 
ability may indicate the involvement of outside 
expertise. 
3.2.3 Sociability 
Sociability, or the preference for engaging with 
others instead of being alone, is a more important 
measurement for profile development than shyness 
(an emotional tension when interacting with others). 
The willingness of an individual to engage in social 
interactions is a more important factor in deciding 
how to approach an individual than their internal 
emotional state when the interaction is occurring. 
Additionally, for online communications, shyness 
has been found to have an impact on certain 
technologies but not others. Shyness is negatively 
correlated with the number of Facebook friends an 
individual has (Orr, et al., 2009), but not correlated 
with email or chat usage (Scealy, Phillips, & 
Stevenson, 2002). While sociability is of primary 
use, noting factors related to shyness may explain 
excessive nervousness or anxiety during the baseline 
questioning in an interview. 
The Cheek and Buss five point sociability scale can 
be used as a baseline for measuring sociability in the 
profiling process. While their scale includes self-
reported answers to questions like "I'd be unhappy if 
I were prevented from making many social 
contacts", the same characteristics can be measured 
indirectly (albeit with less precision) using features 
extracted during the digital forensics process 
(Cheeck & Buss, 1981). The following four features 
should be reviewed to evaluate the sociability of a 
subject. 
3.2.3.1 Sources of Interaction. The different 
methods that an individual uses to communicate 
online can be enumerated. Methods may include but 
are not limited to social media pages, forums, chat 
rooms, instant messaging clients, and email. The 
number of different methods and the number of 
accounts present for each method can be compared 
to expected numbers based on the person’s age, 
position, financial status, and technical ability. 
Additionally, the immediacy and directness of 
interaction should be considered. Posting to a forum 
does not involve a real-time conversation, and is 
generally not to a specific person. Skype chats, 
however, are real time and are closer to in-person 
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interactions. More direct, extensive sources of 
interaction would tend to indicate a higher 
sociability score.  
3.2.3.2 Volume of Interaction. While the total 
number of accounts the subject has is indicative of 
their signing up for various services, they may do so 
to test out an application or for a one-time use (e.g., 
throwaway email accounts used to register for a 
questionable website). The number of individuals 
that a subject interacts with and the frequency of 
interaction with each individual can provide insight 
into sociability. This can include email contacts, 
Facebook friends, or chat room partners. In addition 
to the number of interactions, longer responses to 
messages and attempts to prolong conversations by 
asking questions or engaging on other topics can be 
seen as markers of high sociability. 
3.2.3.3 Responsivity. Individuals with a high 
sociability are more likely to seek out interaction, 
and a higher rate of conversations that they initiate 
(as opposed to respond to) is expected. Additionally, 
developing a forensic timeline of a subject’s usage 
patterns can show how quickly they interact with 
others once they begin using a device or service.  
3.2.3.4 Interaction Duration. Subjects with higher 
sociability would be expected to have longer 
conversations, and more verbose and thoughtful 
qualitative responses to individual messages. For 
real-time conversations, the exact duration of 
interaction can be directly measured based on 
session time. For offline interactions, the time 
between the first and last posting by the subject can 
serve as a long-term communications duration. 
Individuals who have a large number of meaningful 
interactions that show positive sociability are more 
likely to want to engage during an interview. 
Additionally, they may make better targets for 
potential consensual monitoring engagements, and 
are more likely to have spoken with associates about 
information that may be meaningful to an 
investigation. For those with extremely high 
sociability, investigators may only need to make 
themselves available online in the proper context 
and the subject may engage them.  
3.2.4 Domain Knowledge 
The most difficult factor to qualify (or quantify) is 
the subject matter expertise of an individual in the 
criminal conduct of interest. For online crimes, the 
conduct may be hacking ability, virus writing, or the 
acquisition of child pornography. Offline expertise 
could include anything from the ability to break into 
a house to bomb building. Cross-domain criminal 
skills can include talents that are applicable to 
multiple criminal endeavors and include areas 
ranging from observational skills to social 
engineering. 
Ericsson, et al. (1993) identified 10,000 hours of 
practice as the defining time to becoming an expert 
in a variety of fields, ranging from chess to music. 
Similar work has shown that criminals develop 
expertise in their specific areas based primarily on 
experience. Wright, et al. (1995) studied residential 
burglaries and showed that experienced burglars 
identify more vulnerabilities in homes than lay 
persons. Additionally, criminal experience has been 
shown to develop expertise in the perceptions of 
violent criminals (Topalli, 2004). In the online 
world, the value placed on criminal technical skills 
is evidenced by the purchase of these skills by 
groups ranging from traditional profit-seeking 
cybercriminals to terrorists (Radianti, Rich, & 
Gonzalez, 2009; Warren & Streeter, 2006). 
Most of the criminals encountered will have sub-
expert skill levels in their domain. This provides an 
opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is that, 
if the investigative team has a true expert available, 
they will likely be able to accurately assess an 
individual of lesser skills. The challenge is that, in 
many criminal domains, a subject with sub-expert 
level skills can still have a large impact, and the 
difference between a talented amateur and an expert 
may not be meaningful in developing a profile.  
There are several steps involved in building a 
technical profile based on a subject’s criminal 
domain knowledge. Identifying a relevant domain, 
assessing the amount of time the subject has spent in 
that domain, evaluating the subject’s use of language 
and terminology related to the domain, and 
determining the subject’s standing amongst others in 
that domain are the key factors in evaluating the 
subject’s criminal expertise. 
3.2.4.1 Identify Relevant Domain(s). The criminal 
domains of interest are generally pre-determined 
from the type of crime being investigated and 
determined prior to the technical profile 
development. In a virus writing case, malware 
development would be the relevant domain. For a 
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terrorist attack involving a suicide vest, bomb 
making would be the relevant domain. Less obvious 
are the secondary criminal domains that may be 
relevant. The virus writer may have needed expertise 
on air gaps in place at a location to write an effective 
virus, requiring research and surveillance skills. 
Similarly, the terror group may have needed 
targeting skills to identify a high impact venue and 
recruiting skills to identify and enlist individuals to 
deploy their weapons. For criminal enterprises, all 
subjects should be assessed against the relevant 
domains for the enterprise as a whole to determine 
their role(s) in the organization. 
3.2.4.2 Assess Experience in a Domain. Because 
experience is the key factor in expertise, assessing a 
subject’s prior domain experience is valuable. The 
duration of the experience, coupled with the amount 
of time the subject focused on that experience, can 
be partially measured through digital interactions. 
The first visit to a website or forum related to the 
domain, or the first email exchange to mention 
keywords related to the domain, may point to the 
initiation of interest in that area. This will become 
increasingly true going forward with increased 
adoption of services like Google Mail that allow 
users to retain correspondence indefinitely.  
Following the identification of the initial interest, the 
percentage of online time spent engaged in a domain 
can likewise be measured. Activity information is 
generally readily available through proxy logs, 
Internet history extracted from seized devices, and 
trap-and-trace order results. While explicit 
information on interests can be gleamed from 
correspondence if available, implicit interest can be 
identified through time spent on particular web 
pages and the amount of scrolling done (though 
these are both difficult to measure forensically) 
(Claypool, Le, Wased, & Brown, 2001).  
With an increase in the usage of computer-based 
training, including online degree programs, formal 
evidence of related education to a criminal domain 
may be available as well. An online master’s degree 
in biochemistry may increase the threat potential of 
a subject browsing information on chemical warfare, 
whereas completing a certification program as a 
locksmith would be relevant in a breaking-and-
entering case. Similarly, subjects may have related 
indicators of relevant education, including 
memberships in professional organizations that have 
baseline education and experience as criteria to join. 
This may be apparent through emails from a 
professional association or online access to restricted 
journals in a field. 
3.2.4.3 Evaluate a Subject’s Use of Terminology. 
There are generally linguistic clues available in a 
subject’s correspondence as to their level of 
expertise in a domain. A subject’s use of uncommon 
terms particular to a domain, and their proper use of 
those terms, are related to their level of domain 
expertise. An individual talking intelligently about 
the virtues of Classless Inter-Domain Routing is 
more likely to have an advanced knowledge of 
networking than a person that refers to opening their 
web browser as “clicking on the Internet”. The 
terminology can be identified as part of processing 
correspondence, and looking at term frequency of 
the subject’s correspondence against the baseline 
term frequency of others in a conspiracy (or against 
the general public) can quickly tease out 
differentiators.  
Terminology-based assessments can be performed 
on web searches as well. Jenkins et al showed 
quantitative differences in how domain experts 
search as opposed to non-experts. Domain experts 
were shown to have a more depth-first approach in 
their search strategies, and this expertise was able to 
be differentiated from search ability (Jenkins, 
Corritore, & Weidenbeck, 2003). 
3.2.4.4 Professional Standing. While investigators 
may think of a profession in terms of legal 
endeavors, criminals have professions as well. They 
form groups that rely on specialized experience to 
obtain compensation, and can have hierarchies 
within these groups that are meaningful. Because 
there are no board certifications or elections for 
hackers, their absolute location and status in the 
knowledge pantheon cannot be definitively 
identified. Their relative position can be established, 
however, by an analysis of their interaction with 
others in their profession. 
The primary method for digitally exploiting social 
networks for expertise is through the subject’s online 
communications. Link analysis of messaging from 
multiple sources can quickly allow investigators to 
identify “hubs” – individuals whose expertise is 
sought by others and have larger numbers of 
interconnections with other experts. On a micro-
scale, individual communications can be examined 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1) 
17 
to determine the context of the correspondence. If 
the ratio of queries within a domain that an 
individual responds to is higher than the ratio of 
queries they generate, whether in online forums, 
email communications, or text messages, they are 
likely to be regarded as having a higher level of 
expertise. An even more accurate measure, if the 
correspondence is available, is messages between 
others previously identified as experts that reference 
the subject. Sentiment analysis in linked messages 
that mention the subject can provide an evaluation of 
their skills that is unbiased, as opposed to being 
potentially clouded by the deference that may be 
shown in direct communications due to non-
expertise related hierarchical relationships. 
Expertise determinations can help link crimes, 
eliminate subjects, determine how long a subject has 
been operating, and ensure the investigative team 
has the necessary skills to pursue the subject. With 
increasing adoption of digital education and the 
breadth of digital communications channels 
available for forensic exploitation, a subject’s 
expertise can be sufficiently approximated before 
the need for direct interaction. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The Silk Road case provided an excellent window 
into how a digital profile can be used in an 
investigation. The agents involved did an exemplary 
job and built a digital biography of the Dread Pirate 
Roberts that allowed them to link seemingly 
unrelated accounts and activities that ultimately 
identified the subject. Additionally, they used 
affinity and competency evaluations as evidence in 
the complaint process–several of the statements 
made by Ulbricht relating to coding and server 
maintenance were presented as evidence of his 
technical expertise and domain knowledge to 
establish that he was involved in the development 
and running of the site. Ulbricht’s use of 
countermeasures became part of his undoing as 
well–his purchase of fake identity documents and 
use of encrypted VPN tunnels helped facilitate his 
identification and arrest. Finally, agents exploited 
Ulbricht’s sociability in communicating with him 
when Ulbricht attempted to arrange a murder-for-
hire hit on FriendlyChemist, a former Silk Road 
vendor (United States Government, 2013).  
While the agents pursuing Silk Road weren’t 
necessarily using a formal digital profiling 
methodology, codifying their work and the work of 
investigators who have faced similar challenges 
allows for the development of a framework for 
practical use. The guidance presented in this paper is 
provided to investigators to assist in creating an 
idiographic digital behavioral profile in active 
criminal cases. The profile can be developed 
iteratively and refined during the course of an 
investigation. When multiple potential users are 
involved, as may be the case with judicially 
authorized data intercepts of Internet traffic (e.g., 
from a wireless access point), profiling can assist in 
subject disambiguation. Ultimately, a successful 
profile will provide immediate value to investigators 
in case planning, subject identification, lead 
generation, obtaining and executing warrants, and 
prosecuting offenders.   
REFERENCES 
1. Cheeck, J. M., & Buss, A. H. (1981). Shyness 
and sociability. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 41(2), 330. 
2. Claypool, M., Le, P., Wased, M., & Brown, D. 
(2001). Implicit interest indicators. Proceedings 
of the 6th International Conference on Intelligent 
User Interfaces, ACM, 33-40.  
3. Colombini, C., & Colella, A. (2013). Digital 
profiling: A computer forensics approach. 
Availability, Reliability and Security for 
Business, Enterprise and Health Information 
Systems, 330-343. 
4. Colombini, C., Colella, A., & Italian Army. 
(2012). Digital scene of crime: Technique of 
profiling users. Journal of Wireless Mobile 
Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and 
Dependable Applications. 
5. Compton, D., & Hamilton, J. (2011). An 
examination of the techniques and implications 
of the crowd-sourced collection of forensic data. 
Third International Conference on Privacy, 
Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT), IEEE, 892-
895. 
6. Denning, D. E., & Baugh Jr., W. E. (1999). 
Hiding crimes in cyberspace. Information, 
Communication & Society, 2(3), 251-276. 
7. Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer, 
C. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in the 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1) 
18 
acquisition of expert performance. 
Psychological Review, 100(3), 363. 
8. Florencio, D., & Herley, C. (2007). A large-
scale study of web password habits. Proceedings 
of the 16th International Conference on World 
Wide Web, ACM, 657-666. 
9. Gaw, S., & Felten, E. (2006). Password 
management strategies for online accounts. 
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security, ACM, 44-45. 
10. Grabosky, P. (2000). Computer crime: A 
criminological overview. Workshop on Crimes 
Related to the Computer Network, 10th United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders. Vienna. 
11. Herley, C. (2012). Why do Nigerian Scammers 
say they are from Nigeria? WEIS.  
12. Jenkins, C., Corritore, C. L., & Weidenbeck, S. 
(2003). Patterns of information seeking on the 
Web: A qualitative study of domain expertise 
and Web expertise. IT & Society, 1(3), 64-89. 
13. Krone, T. (2004). A typology of online child 
pornography offending. Australian Institute of 
Criminology. 
14. Merritt, K., Smith, D., & Renzo, J. (2005). An 
investigation of self-reported computer literacy: 
Is it reliable. Issues in Information Systems, 6(1), 
289-295. 
15. Ngo, F. T., & Parternoster, R. (2011). 
Cybercrime victimization: An examination of 
Individual and Situational level factors. 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 
5(1), 773-793. 
16. Nykodym, N., Taylor, R., & Vilela, J. (2005). 
Criminal profiling and insider cyber crime. 
Digital Investigation, 2(4), 261-267. 
17. Orr, E., Sisic, M., Ross, C., Simmering, M. G., 
Arseneault, J. M., & Orr, R. R. (2009). The 
influence of shyness on the use of Facebook in 
an undergraduate sample. CyberPsychology & 
Behavior, 12(3), 337-340. 
18. Radianti, J., Rich, E., & Gonzalez, J. J. (2009). 
Vulnerability black markets: Empirical evidence 
and scenario simulation. 42nd Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, 
IEEE, 1-10. 
19. Rogers, M. K. (2006). A two-dimensional 
circumplex approach to the development of a 
hacker taxonomy. Digital investigation, 3(2), 
97-102. 
20. Rogers, M. K. (2010). The psyche of 
cybercriminals: A psycho-Social perspective. In 
Cybercrimes: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, 217-
235. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
21. Scealy, M., Phillips, J. G., & Stevenson, R. 
(2002). Shyness and anxiety as predictors of 
patterns of Internet usage. CyberPsychology & 
Behavior, 5(6), 507-515. 
22. Topalli, V. (2004). Criminal expertise and 
offender decision-making: An experimental 
analysis of how offenders and non-offenders 
differentially perceive social stimuli. British 
Journal of Criminology, 45(3), 269-295. 
23. United States Government. (2013, September 
27). Criminal Complaint. Retrieved  on October 
11, 2013 from    
http://www.scribd.com/doc/172773407/Ulbrich
t-Criminal-Complaint-Silk-Road 
24. Warren, P., & Streeter, M. (2006). Cyber Alert: 
How the World is Under Attack from a New 
Form of Crime. Vision Paperbacks. 
25. Wright, R., Logie, R. H., & Decker, S. H. 
(1995). Criminal expertise and offender decision 
making: An experimental study of the target 
selection process in residential burglary. Journal 
of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 32(1), 
39-53. 
 
